The empty phrases concerning the states' margin of appreciation-repeated in the court's judgments for tool ong already-areu nnecessary circumlocutions,s erving onlyt oindicate abstruselyt hat the States maydoa nythingt he Court does not consider incompatible with human rights […] (Brauch 2005,1 48) 
Introduction
One of the constant tensions in multilevel legal and political orders concerns the allocation of authority among the bodies at different levels.¹ What scope of autonomys hould they enjoy over various issue areas, and how should they be checked or balanced?One of the recent arenas for such tension and debate concerns the role of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which is entrusted the power of judicial review over the memberstates of the Council of Europe's compliancew ith the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR,C onvention). According to the 'Copenhagen Criteria' of accession to the European Union (EU), the ECtHR thus serves importantgatekeeper functions for applicant states to the European Union (European Council1993). It also monitors the continual compliancewith the Convention by existing members-which is of shared concern for all EU states.Inexercisingits powers,the Court must often combine apparentlyi rreconcilable requirements: it must assess and sometimes criticize the states' legislation and policies-yetr espect the sovereignty of those of the states which are well functioning democracies. Further controversies have This changei ntroduces two new phrases into the Convention. The principle of subsidiarity is familiar from federal thought,e xpressing ar ebuttable presumption to place authority as local as possible. The margin of appreciation doctrine was developed by the Court itself. The Court thereby grants astate the authority, within certain limits, to determine whether the rights of the ECHR are violatedin ap articularc ase.
Critics mayf ear that these two quite diffuse and contested phrases will further obfuscate rather thani mproveo nt he Court'sr esponse to the dilemma between human rights protection and respect for sovereignty.S ubsidiarity is used in so manyd ifferent ways that it mayp rovide an intellectual guise to cover up the Court'scompleteabdication from the role of human rights protector in Europe by granting states broad discretion. EU accession-if it will indeed occur-will pose further challenges: does subsidiarity guide the decisions about which of the two European courts should be superior,a nd how they should exercise their authority?S hould the EU enjoy as imilar margin of appreciationasthe member states of the Council of Europe? That might seem to follow from the general presumption in the treaty negotiations thatt he EU should be treated on an equal footingw ith the contracting states. Fori nstance,t he negotiation team behind the draft agreed inter alia that "current control mechanism of the Convention should, as far as possible, be preserved and applied to the EU in the samew ay as to other High Contracting Parties" (47+1( 2013), para7 ).
This chapter seeks to reduces uch fears. The margin of appreciation, duly specifiedi nwaysg uided by the principle of subsidiarity,c an contributet oa lleviate this tension in ad efensible way. A 'Principle of Subsidiarity' can alleviate some of the challenges posed by the margin of appreciation doctrine, in particular that it sacrifices human rights protection on the altar of respect for state sovereignty.S ection 1p resents the Margin of appreciation doctrine and some criticism raised against it,section 2sketches versions of the principle of subsidiarity relevant for this discussion. Section 3s eeks to bring subsidiarity to bear on the question of which authority the ECtHR should enjoy within amulti-level European legal order,a nd in particular whyi ts hould grant states ac ertain margin of appreciation. Section 4c onsiders how these arguments concerning am argin of appreciation applies to the European Union-leaving the manyo ther aspects of accession aside.
1T he margin of appreciation and itsc ritics
The margin of appreciation doctrine ('the Doctrine')i sapractice whereby the Court sometimes defers to the state'so wn judiciary about whether the Convention rights have been violated. The Doctrine is often traced back to the 1958 Cyprus case wheret he then Commission asserted that the UK authorities "should be able to exercise acertain measure of discretion in assessing the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation" (Greece vU nited Kingdom 1958 Kingdom -1959 . In this caset he issue was as tate of public emergency,a ne xemption clause in Art1 5. Am argin of appreciation is claimed by the Court to be appropriate for at least three main issue areas.
-' Balancing' the rights against other urgent issues such as emergencies, public safety,the economic well-being of the country etc-as permitted for several rights to privatel ife, religion, expression etc (Art 8, 9, 10). -' Balancing' or 'trade-offs' among different private human rights in the Convention-such as between freedom of expression (Article 10) and privacy(Article 8). -How to applyt he norms to the specific circumstances of as tate, which may depend on shared values and traditions or perceivedt hreats.
To grant amargin of appreciation, the Court often requires that the accused state has undertaken a 'proportionality test' to checkifthe rights violation could have been avoided by other policies in pursuit of the same social objectives. The Doctrine has receivedmuch praise and much criticism, some of both are well deserved. It expresses some respect for sovereign democratic self-govern-ment but onlywithin some limits: for instance, the Court has hardlyevergranted amargin of appreciation concerning infringements to rights to life, or against torture or slavery (Art 2, 3, 4). Yett he 'Doctrine' is so vaguea nd multifarious that even to refer to it in the singular,a nd to call it a 'doctrine' seems undulycharitable. Moref undamentally, the margin of appreciation doctrine maygrant both the ECtHR and powerful states too much discretion, and put human rights at risk, contrary to the purpose of the ECHR.
There are at least threek inds of concern. Firstly, the Doctrine createsl egal uncertainty,because states are unable to predicta nd hence cannot avoid violations of the ECHR (Lester 2009; c f. Brauch 2005 ,125,M acklem 2006 ,A rai-Takahashi 2013 . Indeed, even the judgeso fthe Court disagree about the Doctrine to such an extent that legal certaintys eems at risk:
Ib elievethat it is high time for the Court to banish that concept from its reasoning.I th as alreadydelayedtoo long in abandoningthis hackneyed phrase and recantingthe relativism it implies. ( ZvF inland (1997) , JudgeD eM eyer partlyd issenting)
To some extent the uncertainty is due to the legal norms, rather than the margin of appreciation doctrine itself. Consider Art10which protects freedom of expression-but […] subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as areprescribed by law and are necessary in ad emocratic society,i nt he interests of national security,t erritorial integrity or public safety,for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventingthe disclosureofinformation receivedinconfidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.( Art 10,p ara 2)
The Court often-but not always-grants states amargin of appreciation in determining whether such interests override the right.Thus in the Sunday Times case, am ajority of eleven judgesf ound against the UK, thatArt 10 protected newspapers reportingo nacase. But nine dissenting judgesh eld that this should have been left to the domesticj udiciary:
The differenceo fo pinion separating us from our colleagues concerns abovea ll the necessity of the interferencea nd the margin of appreciation which, in this connection, is to be allowed to the national authorities.( TheS unday Times vU nited Kingdom 1979).
Similar disagreements among judgesa re legio (Observer and Guardian vU nited Kingdom 1991, WingrovevUnited Kingdom 1996) . One upshot of this criticism is that the Doctrine should be made morep recise, and more consistentlya pplied, than is presentlyt he case.
As econd concern is thatt he vagueD octrine leavest oo much discretion to the judges. Again, it would seem that one main response is to make the rules of the doctrine-includingt he consensus test-more precise.
Am ore precise Doctrine does not automaticallya void otherobjections: that such discretion entails afailureofthe ECtHR to protect human rights in the short and long run. The Court thereby "side-step[s] its responsibility as the ultimate interpretative authority in the Convention system" (Yourow 1996,1 81) . Indeed, " [t] he essence of the international control mechanism maye vaporate if there is in fact no effective checku pon national power" (ibid).
Is this ac orrect criticism?I ft he Court is in the habit of granting all statesa very wide margin, the value added of the ECtHR diminishes: it leaveseachstate to be judgeinits owncase. Yetaspracticed, the margin is not granted to the nonderogable rights to life (Art 2),against torture(Art 3), slavery or forced labour (Art 4), though the ECtHR has referred to the margin of appreciation with regard to some aspects of Art 2( cf. BudayevavRussia 2008) and Art 3( M.C.vB ulgaria 2003 and Berganovic vC roatia 2009).² Moreover,t he margin of appreciation often concerns a 'balancing' among rights in the ECHR.S uch 'balancing' does not entail less stringent human rights protection, but rather how the government givess ome rights ac ertain weight compared to other rights. Finally, national courts enjoy such am argin onlyw hen the ECtHR is satisfied that the national court has dulyc onsidered several conditions,i nt he form of ap roportionality test-in good faith (Rasmussen vD enmark 1988) .
So Isubmit thatamore specifiedmargin of appreciation can reduceseveral of the concerns stemmingfrom vagueness, and not risk its objective unduly. But such specification must be guided by an understandingo fw hy am argin of appreciation should be accepted at all. This is the question for which aPrinciple of Subsidiaritym ay be thoughtt oo ffer guidance.
How can the Doctrine help prevent domination in the form of human rights abuses over citizens from their own domestic authorities, without subjecting well-functioning democracies to undue constraints from international judges at the Court,a sp art of the multi-level European legal order?Isubmit that one waytolimit the risk of domination is to specify the doctrine, in light of ageneral account of what the ECtHR should do-and guidedb yp rinciple of subsidiarity.
 Thanks to OddnýM jöll Arnardóttir for these references.
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2S ubsidiarity
Several authors claim thataprinciple of subsidiary supports 'the' margin of appreciation doctrine (Benvenisti 1999 ,Spielmann 2012 ,Kratochvil 2011 ,del Moral 2006 ,614,Sweeney 2005 . Isubmit thatthere is some truth to this claim, mainly in that appeals to subsidiarity indicate the sorts of arguments that maybemade.
The 'principle of subsidiarity' has av ariety of versions, each with long historical roots (Føllesdal 1998) . In the history of political thought principles of subsidiarity address the issue of how to allocate or use authority within apolitical or legal order,typicallyamongst acentreand member units within some sort of federal structure. Forour purposes what unites the various traditions is the assumption that the burden of argument lies with attemptst oc entralize authority.Various principles of subsidiarity express acommitment to leave as much authority to the more local authorities as possible, consistent with achieving the stated objectives. Different versions will arguet hat member units or the centre should have the final sayfor such decisions; or that central action should be permitted or instead required under certain conditions;some versions hold that central action should replace local decisions, others maintain that the centre should rather seek to bolster the local authority'sa bility to make correct decisions.
Forour purposes, it maybehelpfultodistinguish a 'state centric' principle of subsidiarity from 'person-centred' versions of the principle. The formermatches astandard presumption of international lawthat sovereign statesare freetodecide whether they have shared objectiveswhich they judge are better secured by delegatingsome of their authority to some central body-such as an international court.S uch arguments mayb eb asedo ns tates' inability or unwillingness to achieves ufficient coordination absent some centralised body, or simplyt he need for mutualtrust that each state actuallydotheir share. Such pooling of sovereignty mayt hus differ across issue areas depending on the interests of states, the nature of their collective problem, and the new risks induced by acentralized authority.
From this perspective,t he central puzzle of international human rights courts is: if they are the solution, what exactlyi st he problem states have?I n light of the answer,what scope should ad omestic courtr etain for adjudicating the state'scompliancewith the human rights treaty?One answer to the question is that as tate mayw ant to 'bind itself' or commit itself to ar egional or international human rights court (Alter 2008). At least two audiences are important for states submitting themselvestothe ECHR: they maythereby become morecredible in the eyes of theircitizens and thereby securetheir more willing compliance.
And such credibility in the eyes of other statesi si mportant for statesw ho pool sovereignty-such as in the EU.
It might seem odd thatscrutinyand risks of vocal criticism and sanctions by an international bodymay enhance trust.The answer lies in authorities' need for credibility among the governed. We can draw on Margaret Levi'sd iscussions of trust to understand this connection. She holds firstlyt hatc itizens' sense of political obligation helps elicit compliance:
Empirically,political obligation rests on the citizen'sperception that government actors and other citizens aret rustworthy. The activationo fo bligationi mplies institutional arrangements that make promises and commitments credible, but it mayalso requireextraordinary acts of compensation to overcome distrust based on past experiences. ( Levi 1998, 208) Second, an important component to secure such voluntary compliancew ith the lawisg eneral trust in the rule of law. Agents of the state must be trusted to use their powers for the common good, and be lawabidingand lawenforcing.Third, courts that are somewhat independent of the government can bolsters uch trust in several ways:b otht om aintain the rule of law, and to give citizens and officials reasons to believet hat their rulers indeed uphold the rule of law.
The political leadership can express its commitment to the rule of lawp reciselyb yc hoosing to be monitored by independent courts:
What defines its commitment to the rule of lawisthe willingness to be bound by the laws and to ensuret hat the laws arei mplemented and enforced universally. (Levi and Epperly 2010,6) By deciding to be subject to courts,the leadership ties its own handsand ensures some transparencya bout what they do. Ad esired effect is to gain credibility among subjects, by subjecting themselvest os uch scrutiny. Governing bodies thereby enhance citizens' trust that the authorities do indeed seek to respect and promotethe best interests of the subjects. External actors in the form of independent international tribunals thus provide assurance to citizens and other authorities about the authorities' use of power and commitment to the rule of law.
Generally, one mayt hink that as tate-centred version of subsidiarity would support as broad amargin of appreciation as possible, consistent with these objectiveso fm aintaining trust,s ot hat the state retains maximal authority.
A 'person-centred' version of subsidiaritydoes not give such primacy to the state and the interests of states,but instead insists that subsidiarity goes 'all the wayd own.' The states are not the 'natural' reservoir of sovereign authority,b ut should onlyh aves uch legal powers and immunities as needed to secure the shared interests of its members:t he communities and municipalities-and ultimatelyt he citizens whose states they are.
From this point of view,t he importantd esign challengeo fi nternational human rights courts and the margin of appreciation is to grant the state enough authority to promotethe interests of its citizens and of foreigners,whilst preventing the abuse of such powers in the form of human rights violations-and generate trust that this is the case, when such trust is well deserved. Regional or international human rights courts can provide such protections-but at the same time, citizens run the risk thatt hese courts misuse or even abuse their power from incompetence or ill will. In particular, the courts should not limit democratic self-governance unduly, insofar as such governments are sufficientlyr esponsive to the best interests of their citizens.
Forour purposeshere, Isubmit that the 'person centric' principle of subsidiarity is more plausible. Such conceptions of subsidiarity will not support a broad margin of appreciation in general: that would indeed be contrary to the objectivesofthe ECHR (Kratochvil 2011, 332) . Instead, the arguments for the Doctrine must show thatcertain interests of individuals requirecentralized authority abovethe state, e. g. human rights protected and promoted by the ECHR,but that am argin of appreciation is still permitted or even required.
Indeed, whys hould ap erson-centred principle of subsidiarity allow am argin of appreciation at all?I twould seem to re-createthe problems for which the ECtHR were the solution, namely to prevent the state from being judge in its own case-be it human rights violations or arbitration disputes.S tates use human rights treaties to bind themselves. Compare the treaties which primarilya re to solve shared problems among states,w heree ach state onlyb indsi tself as much as necessary to obtain those benefits. In contrast, as tate binds itself to an international human rights court in order to enhance its own credibility as a "rule of law",h uman rights respectingp olitical system. One implication is that treaty interpretationsand adjudication should not minimize the curtailment of state sovereignty.Nor should amargin of appreciation be as broad as possible -to the contrary,why should states enjoyany margin?W enow turn to consider whyi ndividuals' interests mayr equiret hat international human rights judicial review be constrained by am argin of appreciation. Thisr equires us to look at the ECtHR as part of am ulti-level legal order.
3A pplying the Principle of Subsidiarity to the ECtHR and itsM argin of Appreciation
To applythe principle of subsidiarity properlytothe margin of appreciation doctrine involves several steps. We start with the objectives and otherf unctions of the ECHR. These objectives, stated in the Preamble, are,i ns hort,t oh elp secure "universala nd effective recognitiona nd observanceo ft he Rights therein declared" and "to taket he first steps for the collective enforcement of certain of the rights stated in the UniversalD eclaration." Note that this objectived oes not require harmonization across states, but rather to ensurec ertain thresholds of human rights protection. The abstraction of human rights maybeamongst their virtues, since they can be specifiedindifferent ways to reflect such differingcircumstances (Etinson 2013 ). Variation among institutions in different jurisdictions is thus not at hreat to this objective-unlike treaties which explicitlya im at the harmonization of various rules, such as the EU.
Another important de facto function of the ECtHR concerns its role in the European Union. As per the Copenhagen Criteria it is agatekeeper for entry,inthat all applicant states must become subject to the Court as members of the Council of Europe. Moreover,the Court contributes to monitor whether existing member states respect human rights. The latterisimportant not onlyfor the citizens within the country being monitored, but arguably directlyr elevant for all in the EU. The Lisbon treaty allows secondary lawmaking in manyissue areas on the basis of complex qualified majorityv oting (European Council 2007,A rt 16.3 -4). Thus inhabitants are subject to decisions largely decided by politicians of otherstates than their own. They have good reason to insist that thosep oliticians must be stronglyc ommitted to human rights if the subjects are to be able to trust the good willa nd competenceo ft heirn ew rulers. Suspected violations of human rights triggered reactions against Austria after elections there in 2000 (Føllesdal 2006; . That experience led to the inclusion of am ore cautious procedure for the EU in the Treaty on European Union (Treaty on European Union, Nice Amendments 2001,A rt 7. 1).
The next question is why, according to aperson-centred principle of subsidiarity,s hould these objectivesr equire the centralizationo fa djudication of human rights violations to ar egional courta ta ll?A nd which powers should it have-givent hat full harmonization is not an objective?T he express role of the ECtHR is to assist states in securing these objectives: to "ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties" (Art 19 ECHR). The ECtHR is thus not authorised to promotea nd protect human rights by all means. Rather,the task of the ECtHR is 'subsidiary' or supportive and supplementary vis-à-vis the states,t osupplement and strengthen the protection offered by domestic judiciary.S tates remain primary protectors of human rights. The state remains the primary responsible actor to respect human rights.
Note that to ascertain compliancew ith the convention requires local and counterfactual knowledge about avoidable abuse or neglect by meanso ft he laws and policies of theirgovernment, familiarity about the local culture and circumstances, the risks individuals face due to complex interplayb etween majority culturea nd institutions-and about ar angeo ff easible alternative policies which maya void such violations. This is one reason whyt he chamber of the ECtHR which hears ac ase always includes the judge with respect to that particular country.
As regards the need for human rights assurances in afederation with qualified majority voting,i nternational supervisory bodies seem necessary to protect citizensa gainst other EU members tate governments, who now share decision making authority over them. This role of human rights judicial review mayb ecome more important as the EU becomes more subject to majoritarian mechanisms whereall memberstatescan vote. It is then especiallyimportantthatcitizens can trust thata ll member state authorities exercise such powers responsibly. No political party should enjoy domestic political power that may lead them to favorE Up olicies thatv iolate human rights. Humanr ights courts can give assurance to citizens and other members tate governments that each of the state governments is committed to human rights-and that majority rule among them thus is not overlyr isky.S uch concerns are arguablye venm ore salient insofar as EU authorities undermine the democratic bases of legitimation in the members tates (Føllesdal and Hix2 006).
The next question is then, givent he multi-level system wheret he ECtHR plays this supportive,s upplementary role: what contribution does am argin of appreciation doctrine provide? It essentiallyr eturns adjudication of the ECHR to the domestic courts of the very same member state accused of av iolation.
From the perspective of ap erson-centred conception of subsidiarity,t he state organs should retain the final authority to determine compliancew ith the Convention when the ECtHR cannot or is unlikely to provide extra protection. That is: am argin of appreciation should apply insofar and for thoseo bjectives, and under thoseconditions,wherethe domestic courts and other authorities are at least as wells uited as the ECtHR to determine whether there is ab reach. For instance, there should be av ery low risk that the domesticc ourt will skewi ts judgment undulyi nf avour of the state in its dispute with its citizens.
What arguments of this kind mayb eo ffered for the margin of appreciation doctrine?
Firstly, recall that the Court holds thatthe margin of appreciation is restricted in the rights it applies to. The Court hardlygrantsany margin of appreciation when certain rights are at risk under certain emergencies, regardless of what states claim, namelyr ights against tortureo rs lavery.
Secondly, in the three main issue areas wherethe Court holds that domestic authorities are better placed than the ECtHR to judge due to local knowledge,this assessment seems plausible: balancing rights against certain urgent issues, balancing among rights, and applying the norms to specific circumstances where there are local traditions and cultureatstake.The Court oftenclaims that domestic authorities are in principle better placed thana ni nternational court to evaluate such local needs and conditions (Hatton vt he United Kingdom 2003,6 34). Thus the margin of appreciation mayb ei nterpreted and assessed as aw ay the Court expresses subsidiarity by giving the domestic judiciaries the benefit of anydoubt.However,the person-centred conception of subsidiarity does not warrant such ageneral presumption. The Court must assess the risk of human rights abuses in am ore nuanced way, as indeed it does.
The ability of local authorities to strike the balance right is not enough: Under which circumstances are local authorities likely to make decisions in ways thatr espect human rights appropriately? When, in short,w ill domestic laws and policiesb es ufficientlyr esponsive to the best interests of all citizens, and when will the domestic authorities have mechanisms of self-correction in this regard? Is ubmit thatt his is more likelyu nder conditionso fd emocratic rule under the rule of law. Such polities are likelyt ob em ore responsive to human rights and self-correcting than alternative modes of governance. Under functioningdemocratic mechanisms and the rule of lawthe population deliberates about alternative policies and legislativeproposals in light of their implications for all affected parties, so as to promoteb roadlys hared interests whilst avoiding harm to anyone; and an independent judiciary protects the human rights of the inhabitants.
On this line of reasoning,t he ECtHR is unlikelyt op rovide ab etter assessment of violationso ft he Convention thand omestic judiciaries when the sort of deliberation has occurred in good faith. Insofar as this argument holds, the ECtHR should allow no margin of appreciation for rights concerning political participation, freedom of expression and other rights required for well-functioning democratic decision making.And indeed, this appears to be apattern of the margin of appreciation practice:
[…]t akingi nto account the vital importance in ad emocratic society of freedomo fe xpression and freedom of the press,the State'smargin of appreciation in these cases is very nar-
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Furthermore, the majoritarian democratic mechanisms are not particularlyreliable in securing the vital interests and equal respect for those who are likelyt o regularlyf ind themselveso utvoted. Fort his reason, international courts should not grant awide margin of appreciation for the vulnerableinterests of minorities -such as freedom of religion, even in well-functioning democracies. Again, this pattern appears to be in accordancew ith the current practice of the margin of appreciation doctrine.
Finally, even democratic deliberativemajoritarian decision making is not always well functioning. While domestic authorities mayknow more about the domestic setting,t hey need not know much about which alternative policies may servethe legitimate interests and values sufficientlywell. This requires comparative perspectiveswhich domestica uthorities maybet oo myopic to discern. Thus it makes sense for the Court to checkwhether the state has performed aproportionality test when certain human rights appear to be at stake.Such atest checks that state authorities have not overlooked less invasive alternatives, and have not ignored the impact on some groups-and at the same time ensure thatt he populationc an be ascertained that this is in fact the case. Such deliberation about alternativesa nd their impact is of course what well-functioning democratic decision making should be based on.
Insofar as such proportionality testing has not occurred, in well-functioning democracies and elsewhere, the presumption in favorofdomesticdemocratic decision making no longer stands. Indeed, the ECtHR hesitates to grant amargin of appreciation unless there is evidence that the domestic authorities have undertaken such ap roportionality test.Thus the Court oftens tatest hat […] f rom Hirst v. the United Kingdom (no.2 )it could be deduced that the margin of appreciation would be narrower when Parliament had not analysed and carefullyw eighed the competing interests or assessed the proportionality of blanket rules. ( Lindholm and Others v. Norway [Tomtefestesaken] 2012,8 5) Is ubmit thats uch statements by the Court mayn udge states into more careful proportionality testing.T he Court thereby performs its subsidiarity,s upportive function,h elping to improvet he domestic democratic processes.
4S hould the European Union enjoy am argin of appreciation?
If the EU does become party to the ECHR,t his will be an important challenge both for the EU and for the ECtHR.R atification mayr educet he substantive and institutionalf ragmentation of international human rights lawi nE urope. But conflicts willn ot disappear without trace.
One mayw onder what value is added if the EU should accede to the ECHR. At first glance not much seems to be at stake,s ince all member statesoft he EU have alreadyratified the ECHR and are subject to review by the ECtHR.The EUand hence the Union organs including the CJEU-are alreadytreaty bound to respect the ECHR,a nd the Lisbon Treaty enhances the legal standing of the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights.
One importantchangewrought by EU'saccession is thatthe EU will be subject to the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). This court will alsom onitor,a djudicatea nd sanction anyv iolations that might arise. They mayb ev iolations which the CJEU overlooks-and potential violations by the CJEU itself.³ Such monitoringm ay achieves everal benefits. Firstly, it helps reducet he risk of violations of the ECHR-violations that the CJEU might not have identified. Such protection is especiallyi mportant insofar as the chain of delegation from national authorities to EU institutions is tool ong,a nd even more so when importantE Ub odies such as the European Central Bank and the European Commission explicitlyordefacto operate beyond direct democratic control.Their treatment both of Union citizens and of their own employees will be held more closelyt ohuman rights standardsboth by the Charter and by ratification.
Human rights bodies maybeespeciallyimportant institutional mechanisms in the EU duetothe pervasive mistrust characteristic of 'comingtogether' federations in general (Stepan 2000) . Such political ordersemerge when governments seek objectivesbeyond the reachofany single state, and that cannot be secured by treaty agreements alone. Examples of such objectivesi nclude external defense, or common regulations in response to ag lobalizing economy. Ac rucial concern for the joiningstates is to ensure such shared objectiveswithoutallowing undesired centralization or harmonization, or other abuse of central authorities. Human rights regulations and monitoring thata pplyt ot he centre of the federation reduce or removes ome such fear.
 Ia mg rateful to Stian ØbyJ ohansen for this reminder.
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This review mechanism can also provide much needed trust that the EU does indeedr espect these constraints. Such human rights review can servea savaluable trust-building feature among citizens and authorities in an exceedingly complex multi-level political structure. This is of particularv alue in ap olitical order whereindividuals have several sometimes conflicting political obligations, towardb oth their national and European legislation, and wheres uch conflicts maygiverise to understandable suspicions among otherUnion citizens and politicians. In the case of the EU,the national and Union authorities maythus want the domestic populations and national constitutional courts to trust their human rights compliance. By ratifying the ECHR the national authorities give evidence of such sincerity,s ince they thereby let independent international organs monitor and even sanction Union authorities.
These benefits notwithstanding,wecan expectconflicts of interpretation between the ECtHR and the CJEU,and bothabout the EU'sCharter of fundamental rights relationship to the ECHR and about interpretations of the ECHR.While our focus here is on whether the EU should enjoy amargin of appreciation, the arguments require ab rief historicalb ackdrop.
The 1999 Cologne European Council decided to consolidatethe fundamental rights that applied to the EU level and make them more visible in a Charter of Fundamental Rights (European Council1 999,A rt 44 and Appendix IV) (Heinz 2006) . The Charterp rovided am uch needed clarification of the legal human rights obligations of member states, and receivedf ull legal effect,a fter prolonged discussions, when the Treaty of Lisbon entered into forceD ecember 1, 2009.
The Charterincludes awide rangeoflegal rights.Itlists arangeofcivil, political, economic and social rights of European citizens and others resident in the EU.T hese legal rights are said to draw on the ECHR,a nd the case lawo ft he ECtHR,a sw ell as rights derivedf rom the "constitutional traditions" common to the MemberS tates;e conomic and social rights within the European Social Charter and the Community Chartero fF undamental Social Rights of Workers; and otheri nternational conventions to which the EU or its Member States are parties. However,the European Council madenoexplicit mention of anyUNdeclarations or conventions, though theymight be thoughttoexpress rights derived from the common 'constitutional traditions'.
Article 52(3) of the Charter seeks to alleviate anyconflicts between it and the ECHR by insisting thatw heret here are conflicts, "the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the samea st hosel aid down by the said Convention." This presumably means that the judgments of the ECtHR will be bindingo n the CJEU.Hitherto the CJEU has seemed to accept the ECtHR'sviewthat member states cannot avoid their obligations under ECHR even as members of the EU, and the CJEU has so far seemed to aim for consistency. But whose interpretation will be decisive is amatter that remains to be discovered-and this maybecome ac ontestedi ssue. Indeed, one of the several objections the CJEU raised in its opinion concerning the draft ratification treaty was preciselyt his.⁴ Following accession the ECHR will become part of EU law(European Union 2007,Art 216 (2)). This threatens the role of the CJEU as the ultimatea uthority on interpretation of EU law-unless the ECtHR always respects the CJEU'sdecisions. In particular, the ECtHRs hould not be able to bind the EU to the ECtHR'si nterpretation of the ECHR (CJEU 2014,p ara1 83 -4). In particular, the CJEU claimed that no members tate should be allowed to maintain 'higher' human rights standards thanthe Charterwherethe EU has harmonized the relevant laws (Melloni). Thus the CJEU asserts that its interpretationo ft he ECHR-presumably interpreting it consistentlyw ith the Charter-should be authoritative,r ather than deferringt ot he ECtHR'si nterpretation. ECHR organs should not bind the EU to ap articulari nterpretation of rules of EU law. The point of ratification of the ECHR would however seem to be preciselyt os ubjectthe EU to the independent control by the ECtHR,onthe basis of its interpretation of the ECHR.Areservation to this effect by astate accedingtothe ECHR would presumablybestruck down as incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.⁵ Mays uch differences of interpretationo ccur in practice? One important sourceofdiscrepancy is that the CJEU must weigh the various values and objectiveso ft he EU against each other.While human rights are included among the Union'svalues in Article 2, Article 3statesseveral objectivesofthe Union. In particular,the four economic freedoms of the single market-the freem ovemento f people, goods, services and capital-are on the same legal footing as the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Several cases indicate how the CJEU seeks to 'balance' human rights against these market enhancing freedoms when they conflict, e. g. by means of ap roportionality test (de Vries 2013 ,d iscussing intera lia Laval 2007 ,S chmidberger2 003,V iking 2007 ,O mega 2004 .⁶ If the EU accedes to the ECHR on the ordinary terms, it will be for the ECtHR to decidew hen it is asked to judge the CJEU'sw eighing.C onsider in particulart hatt he ECtHR,  The opinion states several other objections.The opinion has receivedmuch attention, including at http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com.br///the-cjeu-and-eus-accession-to-echr.html, http://blogg.uio.no/jus/smr/multirights/content/opinion--a-bag-of-coal-from-the-cjeu, http://www.verfassungsblog.de/opinion--eu-accession-echr-christmas-bombshell-europeancourt-justice/#.V bD-VbPtmkp, http://echrblog.blogspot.com.br///cjeu-rules-draft-agree ment-on-eu.html, http://europeanlawblog.eu/?p=.  http://europeanlawblog.eu/?p=#sthash.MdSwvM.dpuf.  Ia mg rateful to Stian ØbyJ ohansen for nudgingt his expansion.
Subsidiarity to the Rescue fort he European Courts?
but not necessarilythe CJEU,grants human rights priority over ordinary legislation and public policies.
On the otherhand, the ECtHR grants acertain scope of discretion to the parties who have ratified the ECHR.Shouldthe EU and the CJEU come to enjoy similar leeway?
Recall that the "Margin of Appreciation" is defendedasawaytorespect domestic democratic processes thatare more attuned to local peculiarities and traditions, when the policies and legislation has been subject to ap roper proportionality test by the authorities:
By reasono ft heir direct and continuous contactw ith the vital forceso ft heir countries, Statea uthorities arei np rinciple in ab etter positiont han the international judge to give an opinion on the exact contentofthese requirements [of morals] as wellasonthe 'necessity' of a 'restriction' or 'penalty' intended to meet them. (Handyside 1976,p ara 48).
However,t his justification does not hold for the EU bodies Hix 2006,F øllesdal 2014) . The EU is widelyc riticized for being out of touch with local circumstances, and the democratic pedigree of EU decisions is contested. At best,the chains of delegation are too long.F urthermore,the legislative process is not clearly set up to provide the requisitep roportionality test.
Some observers claim thatt he ECtHR usest he margin of appreciation as a 'double standard',e .g.t oa void conflicts with more powerful states (Benvenisti 1999,8 44) . If so we mays uspect that present-and future-'harmony' with the CJEU simplyr eflect the power of the latter rather thananormatively defensible respect for the democratic processes behind EU rules. In defense, these flaws in the democratic qualityo ft he EU mayc hange-indeed, the ECtHR might nudge the EU towardam ores atisfactory proportionality test,i ft he EU accedes to the ECHR.F urthermore, Is ubmit that the ECtHR mayc ontributei nm anys uch ways to render rules, citizens and authorities more trustworthy. Assurance that European decisions will not threaten individuals' human rights, and thatthe national authorities who participate in joint decision making respect human rights domestically, maythus increase the likelihood that citizens and national authorities will accept the majoritarian decisions of the EU (Binder 1995 ,Weiler 1991 .
If the complex EU order is to deserve complianceand support by its citizens and member states,itmust have well developed policies to monitor and protect against suspected human rights violations committed by Union bodies. Such policies must also be trustworthy. TheE CtHR mayt hereforep laya ne specially valuable role in providinga ssurance that EU authorities actuallyc omplyw ith the ECHR.Note that also when EU authorities actually act within their mandate, they maybenefit from such independent monitoring: Such monitoring helps assure citizens that the authorities do indeed act within their mandate.
Sceptics mays till wonder how the ECtHR contributes to trust,g iven thati t regularlyf inds states in violation of the ECHR.I ft his were indeed ac orrect description,the objection is correct: then, the ECtHRdoes not persuade citizens to support the EU-or theirm embers tates.H uman rights norms and bodies will onlyc ontributet oa ssurance in these ways if in fact the institutions satisfy such human rights norms. Otherwise the focus on human rights will instead servetobring even more attention to these failures-and lead to less compliance or at least greater discussion about whether to comply. Isubmit thatitisprecisely this risk that renders the ECtHR at rustworthyt rust-building mechanism, which the members tates-and the EU-can use strategically: The governments 'up the ante' by subjecting its own state and the EU to such review,a nd thus show thatthey are sincerelycommitted to enhance the human rights of its inhabitants. When the states or the EU do in fact generallycomplyw ith the ECHR,a s assessed by the ECtHR,this monitoring does provide assurance that the stateand EU-authorities merit obedience.
5C onclusion,c riticisms reconsidered
In the debate about whether the margin of appreciation doctrine amountstoan abdication by the Court,t he present arguments have come to the rescue of the Doctrine.With the features laid out here, applied within these scope conditions, the Doctrine seems compatible with and even required by the rationale for placing some authority with the ECtHR to adjudicateh uman rights-when this supplementsr eview by domestic courts.When constrained in this way, am argin of appreciation doctrine serves the particular objectiveso ft he ECtHRw ithin the multi-level European legal order,i ncluding its role in monitoringh uman rights complianceb ym embers tates in the European Union. Note,h owever,t hat it is not obvious thatsimilar features and scope conditions should be part of a 'margin of appreciation doctrine' for other international courts,w ith different relations to other actors in the multi-level global system, and with other objectives with different normative weightt han human rights. Nor is it clear thatt he ECtHR should grant the EU such am argin, if the EU becomes subject to the ECHR.The margin of appreciation doctrine was originallym eant to accommodate the legitimate diversity among national legislations and traditions due to local circumstances, and to defer to their familiarity concerning the local needs-as long as they perform ap roportionality test.I tr emains an open question whether similar arguments count in favoro fg ranting the EU discretion in how it chooses to respect and promotehuman rights, since it can hardlybesaid to have a 'national' tradition of its own, nor are Union authorities obviously 'closer' to or more sensitive to local circumstances than the ECtHR.T ot he contrary,the EU mayb es uspected of being insufficientlys ensitive to human rights concerns relative to the other objectivesa nd values laid down in the Lisbon Treaty.
Consider in conclusion, the criticisms voiced against the margin of appreciation doctrine and how aperson-centred conception of subsidiarity can alleviate them. The defence presented here should not cast doubt that the current margin of appreciation doctrine of the ECtHR is vagueand partiallyinconsistent.The implication is that the Doctrine should be improved, rather thanb ea bolished. These arguments thus support the changet othe Preamble of the ECHR wrought by Protocol 15.B ut the general and vaguea ppeal to 'subsidiarity' will neither help settle the dilemmas between sovereignty and human rights protection, nor provide much guide to the Court'su se of the margin of appreciation in the cases brought before it.Wemay hope that Protocol 15 and the possibleaccession of the EU to the ECHR will fuel more philosophicallyi nformed attention to the Court'sinterpretation of subsidiarity and its margin of appreciation doctrine, by philosophers, lawyers and political scientists alike.Indeed, we mayhope that the Court drawsonawell reasonedconception of subsidiarity to further develop its Doctrine.The Doctrine should be specified not in the light of as tate centric conception of subsidiarity which would tend to grant all states aw ide margin to be judge in their owncaseaslong as other stateswould not stop cooperation with them. Rather,aperson-centred subsidiarity principle should be ag uide. It alreadys upportss everal of the features of the current Doctrine. They must be further elaborated, so thatt he margin of appreciation doctrineb ecomes worthy of that name,a nd so that the member states of the Councilo fE urope, and the European Union become and remain worthyo ft heir citizens' obedience. 
